fix(abi,utils): harden decoder input bounds and crypto argument valid - #219
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kuny0707 merged 2 commits intoJul 22, 2026
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…ation ABI decoder (abi): lengths and offsets read from untrusted return data / event logs are bounds-checked before use. decodeUintAsInt rejects values above Integer.MAX_VALUE; dynamic bytes and array lengths are capped by the remaining input before shifting or pre-allocation; slot and parameter-window reads share a checkWindowBounds helper covering both the constructor-reflection and runtime-TypeReference struct decoding engines; offset arithmetic uses Math.multiplyExact. Malformed input now fails fast with IllegalArgumentException instead of integer overflow, StringIndexOutOfBoundsException, NegativeArraySizeException, or an oversized memory pre-allocation. Covered by TypeDecoderDoSTest. SECP256K1 utilities (utils): no-op assert argument checks are replaced with production-active Preconditions validation, PrivateKey.toString() is redacted (explicit export via toStringWithPrivateKey()), and PrivateKey.create tolerates an optional 0x prefix.
… precedence The array rejection in decodeArrayElements checks four conditions but reported only the length; the message now includes length, offset and input length. Parenthesize the 0x-prefix condition in PrivateKey.create to make the evaluation order explicit.
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Jul 22, 2026
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What does this PR do?
abimodule): adds bounds checks, applied before use, for the lengths and offsets read from untrusted return data / event logs. Malformed input now fails fast with a uniformIllegalArgumentExceptioninstead of integer overflow,StringIndexOutOfBoundsException,NegativeArraySizeException, or an oversized memory pre-allocation (DoS).utilsmodule): replaces the no-opassertargument checks with production-activePreconditionsvalidation, and redactsPrivateKey.toString()so the raw key can no longer leak through logs (explicit export moved totoStringWithPrivateKey()).Why are these changes required?
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assert→Preconditionschange, the following arguments go from "silently accepted" to "throwing" in production:Signature.decoderequires exactly 65 bytes,PublicKeyrequires exactly 64 bytes,recoverFromSignaturerequiresrecId ≥ 0and non-negativer/s, etc. This is the fail-fast behavior the audit asked for and is an expected behavior change.PrivateKey.toString()now returns a redacted constant. Any code that relied ontoString()to export/persist the raw private key should switch totoStringWithPrivateKey()(which returns hex without the0xprefix).PrivateKey.create(String)still requires 64 hex chars (an optional0xprefix is allowed); calls that previously passed an invalid length by relying on the no-opassertwill now fail explicitly.