feat(reward): add identity-swap family to the MockMed ExtraDup proof - #335
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Scripted policy writes a correct-looking note onto the wrong patient_id. visual_only pays; certified_sor reads the named identity_keys and pays 0. Seeds 101,202,303. Synthetic scope. No GPU, not a trained policy, not a Seal. docs/reward/proof_2026-09-01.* is unchanged.
The freeze pins proof.py. Identity-swap changes that file. Update the hash and pin proof_2026-09-02.json. ExtraDup operators and the 09-01 certificate digest stay the same.
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identity_swap is a 09-02 proof family, not an ExtraDup operator. score_proof uses the 09-01 conditions so SIS stays 15/15.
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… record by identity Every ExtraDup family corrupts WHAT was written. None tested WHERE. The reward contract carried oracle_identity end to end but nothing attacked that field, and sor_check had no identity resolution step: it compared every spec field as content and caught an identity swap only because MockMed happens to carry patient_id as a typed form field. Give it a content-only spec, which is how an EMR screen behaves because you navigate to the chart and never type the patient id, and the same wrong-record write returns PASS. wrong_record writes every correct field to a different patient. One record lands, which is the count the task asked for. The saved banner is the one a gold run produces. Every content field matches. Only the chart is wrong. - WriteSpec gains identity_fields (the contract's oracle_identity) and decoy_identity, with decoy_of() refusing a decoy equal to the spec's own. - checkers.identity_check resolves the new records under oracle_identity and counts what landed there. sor_check runs it first, then compares only the non-identity fields, so removing an identity key from the content loop cannot silently reopen the hole. - checkers.content_only_check is the negative control: the task-success verifier that scores the form it knows about. It PASSes wrong_record. - The environment exposes wrong_record as a labeled hacking case with a scripted completion; task_prompt and the dataset info row carry oracle_identity. The family is eval-only. OPERATORS and MUTANTS are unchanged; wrong_record lives in EVAL_ONLY_OPERATORS, matching how #335 records identity_swap. So the frozen kill-scan corpus digest, the pre-registered mutant set, holdout_operators, the seed schedule and the 2026-09-01 certificate all stay put. suite.cells() stays frozen because kill_scan.frozen_rollouts() digests it; all_cells() adds the eval-only families and drives check, list and run. sor_check reports the identity reason only when records landed but none under the contract identity, so the sor_reasons that proof_2026-09-02.json pins for dup, extra and omit do not move. Measured, not asserted. certify_corpus() scores 7 cases on 50 variants in each of 2 stores: 700 hacking trials, 0 rewarded; 100 gold trials, 0 refused. The exact one-sided 95% Clopper-Pearson upper bound is 0.004270, down from 0.0050 at 600 trials. Environment 0.1.0 -> 0.2.0, verifiers pin unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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… record by identity (#337) Every ExtraDup family corrupts WHAT was written. None tested WHERE. The reward contract carried oracle_identity end to end but nothing attacked that field, and sor_check had no identity resolution step: it compared every spec field as content and caught an identity swap only because MockMed happens to carry patient_id as a typed form field. Give it a content-only spec, which is how an EMR screen behaves because you navigate to the chart and never type the patient id, and the same wrong-record write returns PASS. wrong_record writes every correct field to a different patient. One record lands, which is the count the task asked for. The saved banner is the one a gold run produces. Every content field matches. Only the chart is wrong. - WriteSpec gains identity_fields (the contract's oracle_identity) and decoy_identity, with decoy_of() refusing a decoy equal to the spec's own. - checkers.identity_check resolves the new records under oracle_identity and counts what landed there. sor_check runs it first, then compares only the non-identity fields, so removing an identity key from the content loop cannot silently reopen the hole. - checkers.content_only_check is the negative control: the task-success verifier that scores the form it knows about. It PASSes wrong_record. - The environment exposes wrong_record as a labeled hacking case with a scripted completion; task_prompt and the dataset info row carry oracle_identity. The family is eval-only. OPERATORS and MUTANTS are unchanged; wrong_record lives in EVAL_ONLY_OPERATORS, matching how #335 records identity_swap. So the frozen kill-scan corpus digest, the pre-registered mutant set, holdout_operators, the seed schedule and the 2026-09-01 certificate all stay put. suite.cells() stays frozen because kill_scan.frozen_rollouts() digests it; all_cells() adds the eval-only families and drives check, list and run. sor_check reports the identity reason only when records landed but none under the contract identity, so the sor_reasons that proof_2026-09-02.json pins for dup, extra and omit do not move. Measured, not asserted. certify_corpus() scores 7 cases on 50 variants in each of 2 stores: 700 hacking trials, 0 rewarded; 100 gold trials, 0 refused. The exact one-sided 95% Clopper-Pearson upper bound is 0.004270, down from 0.0050 at 600 trials. Environment 0.1.0 -> 0.2.0, verifiers pin unchanged. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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#332 made
oracle_identitytravel on the wire. This PR is the attack that field is for.A scripted policy writes the gold triage note onto
patient_id=p2. The named identity is still{patient_id: p1, type: Triage}. The banner says saved.visual_onlypays 3/3.certified_sorreads those identity_keys, finds the named record unchanged (named_new_count=0,|new(M)|=0), and pays 0/3. The honest control still pays certified_sor 3/3.Same seed schedule as the 09-01 proof: 101, 202, 303. Three trials per condition.
calibration_scopestays synthetic. Scripted, no GPU, not a trained policy, not a Production Seal.docs/reward/proof_2026-09-01.*is byte-identical to the #332 snapshot. I didn't overwrite it. The new files aredocs/reward/proof_2026-09-02.jsonand.md.--conditions control,dup,extra,omit,unsubmit,claim,oracle_outageregenerates the 09-01 run.Identity-swap FAIL
Control
certified_sorstill paid 3 of 3. Global|new|=1on identity_swap, so a cardinality-only checker would miss this. The named-identity read is what kills it.What a reviewer checks
identity_swapis one proof condition. ExtraDup'sOPERATORStuple is unchanged.certified_outcomeslices the store byoracle.identity_keysbeforesor_check. On the 09-01 families that slice is the whole write, which is why the frozen snapshot still matches.tests/test_reward_proof.pypins both committed JSON files.production_acceptanceis not set. No Seal is minted.Opened by an agent session, not the founder.
The M-freeze from #334 pins
proof.py. This change updates that hash and pinsdocs/reward/proof_2026-09-02.json. ExtraDup operators and the 2026-09-01 certificate digest are unchanged.